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"It has many times been held that it is not essential to the creation of a condition
subsequent that a forfeiture clause should be inserted," 3 6 and,
"It is not material that a re-entry clause is not included in a conveyance, before the
court will uphold the claim of a reversionary interest, if the language of the conveyance
plainly imports that the grant conveys only a conditional fee," 3 7 and,
"Where the language employed declares a condition and imports a forfeiture a clause
of re-entry is not necessary,"38
may contain some technical truth, the facts are that since 1901 no condition relied
upon to gain a forfeiture has been upheld by the California appellate courts unless
a provision for forfeiture or right of entry for condition broken was expressly included.
A review of recent California cases,39 where the conveyance was held sufficient
to create an estate on condition subsequent indicates that an effective instrument would
provide: (1) that the grant is made "upon the express condition subsequent that";
(2) that the use of the property designated is to be "the exclusive use"; (3) that the
grant is made on the condition that the grantee not only initiate such use of the land
but that he maintain such use "perpetually" and "forever"; (4) that "all the fore-
going provisions are declared to be conditions in favor of the grantor upon which
the title of the grantee shall depend, the grantor reserving to himself the power
of termination, to re-enter on breach of any of the said conditions and terminate the
estate of the grantee."
One infrequent example of such draftsmanship may be found in Rosecrans v.
Pacific Electric Railroad.
40
As the number and size of civic and charitable organizations continue to grow,
limited grants of real property for their use will be made with greater frequency.
If the limitations as to the use of the property are to have any effect beyond what
resulted in the Faust v. Little Rock School District case, the draftsmen of the con-
veyancing instrument must compensate for this ever-strengthening bias of the courts
against forfeiture by spelling out in exacting detail the intention of the grantor to
create an estate on condition subsequent.
4 1  Howard . Privett.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR: THE "THING" SPEAKS AGAIN.-Alex Rohar was a careful
man. At least the jury must have thought so when they reached a verdict in his favor,
because Rohar could not have won if they had felt differently. But win he did-
thanks to a legal doctrine which, although well known in the profession of law, was
in all likelihood unknown to Rohar until his attorneys found that it might be employed
in his suit against Henry Osborne, Sr., and his son, Henry, Jr., proprietors of Shank's
Economy Store. Res ipsa loquitur-"the thing speaks for itself"-was then extended
a little further by the California courts, and made to "speak" in Rohar's behalf.
The case1 was born when defendants Osborne, who operated a hardware store
known as Shank's Economy Store, rented a weed burner to plaintiff Rohar, a general
" Victoria Hospital Assn. v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 147 Pac. 124 (1915).
"7 See note 25 supra.
"8 Fitzgerald v. County of Modoc, 164 Cal. 493, 129 Pac. 794 (1913).
"- Rosecrans v. Pacific E. Ry., 21 Cal.2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943) ; Romero v. Dept. of Public
Works, 17 Cal.2d 189, 109 P.2d 662 (1941); see Miller v. Shaw, 50 Cal.App. 702, 195 Pac. 743
(1920) ; Firth v. Los Angeles Pac. Land Co., 28 Cal.App. 399, 152 Pac. 935 (1915).
, 21 Cal.2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943).
" This estate and determinable estates are distinguished in Shultz v. Beers, 111 Cal.App.2d
820, 245 P.2d 334 (1952) ; Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal.App.2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951).
' Rohar v. Osborne, 133 A.C.A. 441, 284 P.2d 125 (1955).
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hand on a chicken ranch operated by one W. E. Pruitt. Rental of the equipment
was more or less of a courtesy extended by defendants to their customers, the rental
being $1. The weed burner had been in use for some five years at the time that it was
rented to plaintiff, and had been acquired by defendants from a manufacturing firm-
which firm was also named as a defendant in this action, but whose case will not be
discussed here. Suffice it to say that the manufacturer was absolved from liability
in the trial court, and that plaintiff did not appeal.
The weed burner in question consisted of a cylindrical tank with a plate welded
on at each end, the top end having a two-inch tube housing a small pump. This
tube could be removed, and it was established at the trial that if this were done,
then the inside of the tank would b'e visible. Attached to the top of the tank was
a steel tube, which in turn connected to a flexible hose at the end of which was a
heating coil and fire jet. The fuel, kerosene, would be poured into the two-inch hole,
the top screwed on, and the pump operated so as to create pressure inside the tank.
The kerosene would then be forced out through the hose and ignited.
Plaintiff testified that after obtaining the weed burner from the defendants he
took it to the ranch where he was employed, filled it about two-thirds full, pumped
it up to fifteen pounds pressure, and ignited it-all of which was found to be proper
procedure. He used the burner for some time, occasionally laying it down while he
went about fifty feet away to change a water hose. On the last occasion, he was
stooping over to pick up the tank, when it exploded and injured him.
Evidence was given at the trial tending to show that the side walls and bottom
panel of the tank were rusted on the inside, probably because of improper storage
by defendants, that defendants had failed to inspect the inside of the tank for several
years prior to the accident, and that by a visual inspection it could be ascertained
that rust had weakened the metal
Although plaintiff alleged other causes of action, including warranty, the court
held that the case could well be decided on the basis of res ipsa loquitur-this despite
the fact that the doctrine of res ipsa in California historically required exclusive
control by the defendant of the instrumentality causing the damage. In White v.
Spreckels,2 decided in 1909, the court held that the doctrine was inapplicable where
the instrumentality which exploded was not under the control of the defendant, or
where the circumstances were such as to leave it doubtful whether it was the negli-
gence of the plaintiff instead of the defendant which caused the injury. Thus th6
doctrine was found inapplicable to the case of an explosion of a radiator in possession
of a lessee, which occurred while the lessee was drying towels thereon.
In 1928 it was said in Michener v. Huttons that:
"The courts of this state have long since adopted the rule as expressed in I Shearman
and Redfield on Negligence (6th Ed.) p. 132, viz.: 'Where the thing is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of due care." (Emphasis added.)
From these cases it seems evident that over the years some development must
have taken place in California which has resulted in application of res ipsa loquitur
even in situations where the defendant does not have actual and exclusive control
of the instrumentality which does the harm. It appears that use of the words
"probably," "probable," "probability," and "probabilities" in many decisions has
given the doctrine its greatest opportunity for change.4 In Escola v. Coca Cola
2 White v. Spreckels, 10 Cal.App. 287, 101 Pac. 920 (1909).
3 Michener v. Hutton, 203 Cal. 604, 607, 265 Pac. 238, 239 (1928).
'Harrison v. Sutter Street Ry. Co., 134 Cal. 549, 552, 66 Pac. 787, 788 (1901) Osgood v. Los
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Bottling Co.,5 decided in 1944, the court was concerned with the explosion of a
bottle of carbonated beverage which the defendant therein had delivered to a
restaurant where the plaintiff, a waitress, was employed. The court said:
"An explosion such as took place here might have been caused by an excessive internal
pressure in a sound bottle, by a defect in the glass of a bottle containing safe pressure,
or by a combination of these two possible causes. The question is whether under the
evidence there was a probability that defendant was negligent in any of these respects.
If so, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies." (Emphasis added.)'
This reasoning permitted the court to emphasize the other aspects of res ipsa
loquitur while minimizing what appeared to be a head-on conflict between the old
"control by defendant' requisite and the actual fact of no control by him at the
time of the explosion. The court held that control by the defendant at a time prior
to the explosion, that is, when the negligent act probably occurred (perhaps referring
to a defect caused at the time of manufacture or at the time of bottling the beverage)
was sufficient for purposes of applying the doctrine "provided plaintiff first proves
that the condition of the instrumentality had not changed after it left defendant's
possession."7
In 1952 another "exploding bottle" case arose-Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.s
By then the California courts had decided to speak more plainly on the subject of
control, and part of that opinion reads as follows:
"Further, it is settled that the fact that the defendant relinquishes control of the
instrumentality which causes the accident does not preclude application of the doctrine
provided there is evidence that the instrumentality had not been improperly handled by
the plaintiff or some third person, or its condition otherwise changed, after control was
relinquished by the defendant. (Citations.) Of course, it must appear that the defendant
had sufficient control or connection with the accident that it can be said that he was more
probably than not the person responsible for plaintiff's injury." (Emphasis added.) 9
It seems noteworthy that the court continued to indulge the word "control."
And finally in 1955 our principal case, Rohar v. Osborne, was taken on appeal
to the California District Court of Appeal, Second District. That court went beyond
the "exploding bottle" cases, and allowed recovery on the basis of res ipsa loquitur
in a situation where the defendant not only did not have control of the instrumentality
at the time of injury, but where plaintiff had obviously changed its condition (by
placing kerosene in the tank, pumping up pressure, etc.). But nonetheless the court
gave sanction to the rule as stated in the Zentz case, already quoted. A subsequent
petition for a hearing in the California Supreme Court was denied.
Thus, the Thing has managed to retain its hold on the word "control," but it is
today an infinitely weaker word than before. "It would be far better, and much
confusion would be avoided, if the idea of 'control' were to be discarded altogether,
and if we were to say merely that the apparent cause of the accident must be such
that the defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it." 10 Will
the California courts take that final step? -Albert Bianchi.
Angeles, etc., Co., 137 Cal. 280, 282, 70 Pac. 169 (1902); Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 CaL 714, 722,
12 P.2d 933 (1932) ; Godfrey v. Brown, 220 Cal. 57, 66, 29 P.2d 165 (1934) ; Honea v. City Dairy,
Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 617, 620, 621, 140 P.2d 369 (1943) ; Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Cal.2d
605, 619-621, 155 P.2d 42 (1944) ; LaPorte v. Houston, 33 Cal.2d 167, 169, 199 P.2d 665 (1948);
Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal.2d 654, 659-661, 226 P.2d 574 (1951).
'Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
Id., at 459, 150 P.2d at 439.
Id., at 458, 150 P.2d at 438.
8Zentz v. Coca Cola Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952).
Id., at 44, 247 P.2d at 348.
" PROSSER, RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN CALIFORNIA, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 183 (1949).
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